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Before:   JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 






JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In these consolidated appeals, two former employees of the Education 
Management Corporation (“EDMC”) appeal from orders dismissing their separate claims 
of discrimination.  The employees – Michael Scott and Lamont Jones – allege that 
EDMC discriminated against them in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Pennsylvania common 
law.  In each case, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed the discrimination claims in their entirety because it concluded 
that the claims were subject to binding arbitration.  We disagree, and conclude that Scott 
and Jones never agreed to arbitrate these claims.  Accordingly, we will vacate the orders 
of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




 Scott and Jones were employed as Assistant Directors of Admissions at the Art 
Institute of Pittsburgh, an EDMC subsidiary.  In July 2012, both men received what they 
described in their respective complaints – in the very same words – as “inexplicably 
harsh and unfair quarterly job evaluation[s]” that rated their job performance as “below 
expectations.”  (JA 37-38, 53.)  In early August 2012, they both filed complaints with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Jones alleging race and age 
discrimination and Scott alleging only age discrimination. 
 Soon thereafter, in late September and early October 2012, EDMC instituted a 
company-wide alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) policy.  The ADR policy created a 
multi-step process for dispute resolution that culminated in binding arbitration.  The 
policy informed employees that it was “intended to create the exclusive means by which 
all work-related disputes between [EDMC] … and its employees will be promptly 
addressed and fairly resolved.”  (JA 84.)  As to its scope, the ADR policy specifically 
stated that it applied to all “claims of employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation, 
wrongful termination or other alleged unlawful treatment [under] state, local or federal 
law.”  (JA 84-85.)  The ADR policy further provided that “all such disputes [must] be 
                                              
1 Although these cases were consolidated on appeal, they proceeded separately in 
the District Court before different judges.  We will nonetheless recount their facts 
simultaneously, as there is significant overlap in the circumstances giving rise to each 
case – they each worked the same job for the same employer, allege similar 
discriminatory actions taken against them, and filed their nearly-identical complaints on 
the same day.  Also, because this appeal addresses only the validity of the arbitration 




resolved only through final and binding Arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.”  
(JA 86.)  It also stated that “continuing employment with the Company after receipt of 
this Policy constitutes agreement to abide by its terms.”  (JA 84.) 
 Two months after filing their EEOC complaints, Scott and Jones were informed of 
EDMC’s new ADR policy in an automated email sent to all covered employees on 
October 3, 2012.2  The email emphasized that compliance with the ADR policy was a 
term and condition of continued employment, and it requested that employees 
acknowledge their receipt and acceptance of the new policy.  That same day, Jones’s 
attorney – who now represents both Jones and Scott on appeal – sent an email to EDMC 
expressing his client’s belief that the ADR policy was “illegal” and “in flagrant violation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  (JA 685.)  Jones amended his EEOC complaint the next 
day, supplementing his previously-filed complaint and alleging that the ADR policy was 
instituted in retaliation for it.  Scott made the same amendment to his own EEOC 
complaint.     
 Jones’s employment with EDMC was terminated in January 2013, and Scott’s was 
terminated in April 2013.  The EEOC determined there was insufficient evidence for it to 
pursue either of the plaintiffs’ cases and requested additional evidence from them.  The 
plaintiffs instead requested that the EEOC issue them right to sue letters, which it did.   
                                              
2 In September 2012, Scott had taken short-term disability leave, from which he 
did not return until December 2012.  In his complaint, Scott says that upon his return in 
December he was then presented with the ADR policy and EDMC “demanded” that he 
sign it as a condition of his continued employment.  (JA 38.)  Scott says that he “resisted 
repeated pressure to sign it.”  (JA 39.) 
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Scott and Jones filed separate but simultaneous complaints, alleging that EDMC 
had discriminated and retaliated against them, in violation of the ADEA, Title VII, and 
Pennsylvania common law.  After discovery, and on EDMC’s motion, both cases were 
dismissed with prejudice,3 solely on the basis that the discrimination claims fell within 
the terms of the company’s ADR policy and that Scott and Jones had manifested their 
assent to the policy by continuing to work at EDMC after receiving it. 
The plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal, and the cases were consolidated on 
their joint motion. 
II. DISCUSSION4 
 “We exercise plenary review over questions regarding the validity and 
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.”  Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 
172, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).  We must first “determine which standard should have been 
applied” in the District Court – that governing a motion to dismiss or that governing 
motions for summary judgment.5  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 
F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013). 
                                              
3 In Scott’s case, the District Court granted what EDMC styled as a motion to 
dismiss while “apply[ing] the … summary judgment standard” out of “an abundance of 
caution.”  (JA 10.)  In Jones’s case, the District Court “adopt[ed] the reasoning set forth 
in” the previous dismissal order in Scott’s case, as well as referencing a related case 
raising similar issues – Masoner v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 652 (W.D. Pa. 
2014).  (JA 21.) 
4 The District Courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Devon Robotics, LLC v. DeViedma, 798 
F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A]n order dismissing claims in favor of arbitration is 
immediately appealable because it is a final order.” (original emphasis)). 
 5 As we have previously stated, 
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 In choosing between the two standards, we have held that, “if the complaint and its 
supporting documents are unclear regarding the agreement to arbitrate,” the parties 
should proceed through discovery and we should entertain a motion to compel arbitration 
under the standard for assessing motions for summary judgment.  Id. at 776.  Because 
both of these cases have been through discovery, we will apply the summary judgment 
standard.  Under that standard, the parties opposing arbitration, Scott and Jones, are 
entitled to “the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences that may arise.”  Kirleis v. 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We note, however, that neither party has asserted that any material facts 
                                                                                                                                                  
the two standards differ in significant ways. The test in reviewing a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, under 
any plausible reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff would be entitled to 
relief.  We will affirm a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim 
only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint.  We consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic 
documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents. 
 
Under Rule 56, by contrast, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  The party asserting that there is a genuine dispute of material fact 
must support that assertion by citing to particular parts of the record, 
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, 
or other materials.  In evaluating the motion, the court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make 
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.  Because summary 
judgment can be supported or defeated by citing a developed record, courts 
must give the parties adequate time for discovery. 
Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(internal citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). 
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remain in dispute that would foreclose resolution of this appeal.  Accordingly, we turn to 
an assessment of the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. 
“[A] party cannot be compelled to submit a dispute to arbitration unless it has 
agreed to do so.”  Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 584 
F.3d 513, 524 (3d Cir. 2009).  A disputed claim must be arbitrated if “there is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate between the parties,” and “the merits-based dispute in question 
falls within the scope of that valid agreement.”  Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 
215, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “If a party challenges the 
validity … of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must consider 
the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement.”  Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010).  Although it is well established that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) reflects a “strong federal policy in favor of the resolution of 
disputes through arbitration,” Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 
2003), “this presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply to the determination of 
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties,” Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 
160 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Whether such an agreement exists is a question 
of state contract law.  Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Under Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree governs both cases, a valid contract 
exists if: (1) both parties manifested an intention to be bound by the agreement; (2) the 
terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite to be enforced; and (3) there was an 




 EDMC’s motions to dismiss founder on the element of mutual assent.6  The 
company argues that Scott and Jones impliedly agreed to the new policy because “[a]n 
employee’s intent to agree to an ADR policy is manifested when the employee continues 
employment with the company after receiving an ADR policy that provides that 
continuing employment after receipt of the policy indicates acceptance of its terms.”  
(Answering Br. at 29.)  It appears that district courts within our Circuit have accepted that 
argument as a matter of Pennsylvania law.7  In the present cases, however, we need not 
decide whether the argument is sound.  Whatever the validity of EDMC’s legal theory 
that continuing to work can, in and of itself, constitute implied assent to new terms of 
employment, that rule does not control the outcome here.  In the employment context, an 
implied-in-fact contract may arise “by words and [be] inferred from circumstances, thus 
entailing consideration of factors such as oral representations, employee manuals, and 
                                              
6 EDMC says that the plaintiffs did “not raise an issue explicitly challenging th[e] 
core arbitrability ruling,” and have therefore waived the issue.  (Answering Br. at 26.)  
We disagree.  Scott and Jones focused most of the attention in their briefing on their 
claim that the ADR policy was unenforceable because it was instituted in retaliation for 
their EEOC complaints, but they also emphasized that they had both “withheld assent to 
and protested the newly imposed ADR term of employment.”  (Opening Br. at 8.)  They 
similarly noted their “immediate and continual rejection of, resistance to, and/or federally 
contesting of the imposition of the ADR policy and the ADR policy’s retaliatory effect … 
.”  (Id. at 16.)  The plaintiffs repeatedly challenged the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate elsewhere in their brief.  We therefore do not consider this issue waived, and, 
indeed, view it as dispositive. 
7 See, e.g., Alexander v. Raymours Furniture Co., Civ. No. 13-5387, 2014 WL 
3952944, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (collecting cases); see also Bauer v. Pottsville 
Area Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 758 A.2d 1265, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) 
(“Provisions in a handbook or manual can constitute a unilateral offer of employment 
which the employee accepts by the continuing performance of his or her duties.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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party conduct.”  Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  When EDMC added the ADR policy, both Jones and 
Scott did indeed continue working.  But they also promptly voiced their specific 
objection to and rejection of the ADR policy.  Rather than indicate their assent, both men 
quite clearly expressed their strong disagreement with its terms.  Giving further emphasis 
to their dissent, they both supplemented their complaints to the EEOC to allege that the 
ADR policy was an illicit act of retaliation by EDMC.  On the facts here, it cannot be said 
that their continuing to work constituted an agreement to be bound by the new ADR 
policy.  A contract cannot be implied when assent has been expressly disavowed.  See 
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 764 A.2d 587, 594 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000) (rejecting the “legal conclusion that [the offeree] could assent by 
conduct to an offer it had already expressly rejected in writing”).8 
Were that not enough, Pennsylvania law requires that any agreement to arbitrate 
be “clear and unmistakable,” and holds that “such agreements should not be extended by 
implication.”  Emmaus Mun. Auth. v. Eltz, 204 A.2d 926, 927 (Pa. 1964); see also Quiles 
v. Fin. Exch. Co., 879 A.2d 281, 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“[S]uch agreements are 
upheld only where it is clear that the parties have agreed to arbitrate in clear and 
unmistakable manner.”).  We have previously recognized that “under Pennsylvania law, 
explicit agreement is essential to the formation of an enforceable arbitration contract,” so 
                                              
 8 That conclusion is also consistent with the Restatement of Contracts.  With 
limited exception not relevant here, “the rendering of a performance does not constitute 
an acceptance if within a reasonable time the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to 
notify the offeror of non-acceptance.”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 53 (1981). 
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any argument that an employee has “impliedly agreed to arbitrate h[is] claims must fail 
under Pennsylvania law.”  Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 163.  EDMC has not suggested that this 
rule of heightened clarity unfairly targets arbitration clauses for invalidation, and we 
discern no reason in these cases why the Pennsylvania rule should not apply. 
In granting EDMC’s motions to dismiss, both District Courts here relied heavily 
upon Masoner v. Education Management Corporation, which dismissed a discrimination 
complaint against the same employer because of the applicability of the same ADR 
policy at issue now.  18 F. Supp. 3d 652 (W.D. Pa. 2014).  In Masoner, however, the 
plaintiff employee “accepted and agreed to abide by all [of] EDMC’s then-existing 
policies, including the ADR Policy at issue in this case.”  Id. at 656.  The court 
emphasized that the plaintiff had “never asked any questions about the ADR Policy, 
expressed a desire to reject or challenge the terms of the ADR Policy, indicated that she 
found the terms of the ADR Policy to be unfair or oppressive, or made any effort to 
rescind her acceptance of the ADR Policy and its terms.”  Id.  In the Masoner court’s 
view, there had thus been “manifested a clear intention to be bound by the ADR Policy.”  
Id. at 660.  Here, in stark contrast, there was no such agreement.  Indeed, there was an 
explicit disagreement by both Scott and Jones with the terms of the new policy.  The 
object of the “mutual assent” inquiry is to discern “the intent a reasonable person would 
apprehend in considering the parties’ behavior.”  Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott 
Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying Pennsylvania law).  On the record in 
these cases, it cannot rightly be said that either Scott or Jones demonstrated their 
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agreement to the terms of EDMC’s ADR policy.  It was therefore error for the District 
Courts to have dismissed these cases on the basis of the alleged agreements to arbitrate.9 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the orders of dismissal and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
9 Because there was no valid arbitration agreement, we need not address any of the 
remaining arguments raised by the parties.  In particular, Scott and Jones ask us to grant 
summary judgment in their favor.  In the District Court, neither of their motions for 
summary judgment was addressed on its merits – Scott’s motion was stricken as 
premature and Jones’s motion was terminated as moot after EDMC’s motion to dismiss 
was granted.  We decline the plaintiffs’ invitation to be the first court to address the 
merits of their summary judgment motions. 
